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Matt Corallo
matt@bitcoin.ninja
npub185h9...wrdp
10th known contributor to Bitcoin Core. Now Full-Time Open-Source Bitcoin+Lightning Projects at Spiral (Part of Block).
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matt 1 year ago
Never, ever, ever put your hopes in a single politician. They will always let you down. (Assuming you even thought a strategic reserve was a good idea, though really it wasn’t) View quoted note →
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matt 1 year ago
Reminder for Bitcoin devs: When you push code, organized crime is watching. When you add that dependency, North Korea is trying to comprise its dependencies. When you leave your laptop unlocked in public, you don’t know who’s gonna hit a few keys. Stay vigilant. It’s not a lot more work to be careful and avoid dependencies, but it’s a ton of work to clean up after someone loses a billion dollars.
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matt 1 year ago
I’m tried of “non-custodial inflation”. If you’re not above the line, you’re custodial, stop claiming otherwise. View quoted note →
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matt 1 year ago
Trust Models (refer back to this when someone claims their thing is “non-custodial”, note that privacy is a different spectrum) * Holding Funds On Chain * Trusting you can get a transaction confirmed in some time horizon where your balance is way higher than the on chain cost (LN) * Trusting you can get a tree of many transaction confirmed in some time horizon where your balance is way higher than the on chain cost of the whole tree (in-round Ark for high-ish balances, rollups for *very* high balances after some future soft-fork) ^ non-custodial v custodial * Trusting you can get a tree of transactions confirmed in some time horizon where your balance is similar to the on chain cost (in-round Ark for moderate balances, rollups for most folks after some future soft fork) * Trusting 1-of-N with keys (rollups with BitVM) * Trusting N-of-M to do something honestly once in a TEE (statechains maybe?) * Trusting N-of-M to do something honestly once (statechains/statechains-on-Ark) * Trusting N-of-M with keys (Liquid, Fedimint) * Trusting 1 entity with keys (Cashu, Coinbase, …)
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matt 1 year ago
This isn’t specific to BOLT 12 and is really stretching the line on accuracy. Yes, if you reuse a BOLT 12 across two companies they can compare notes and see that you used the same one (duh!), but it’s not “because you reuse the same public key”, it’s because it’s the same thing! But, of course, you don’t *have * to do this. Wallets, by default, should generate a fresh BOLT 12 every time they display the receive key (and LDK will every time the wallet asks for a BOLT 12), including fetching a different “offer_issuer_id”. Ultimately, don’t assume things just based on the name of a field in a spec - the “offer_issuer_id” is a misnomer, LDK actually has a different name for it because of this, and IIRC the spec even says don’t reuse it if you’re a regular end-user wallet! View quoted note →
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matt 1 year ago
What dimension am I in? image
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matt 1 year ago
Before Bitcoin makes any decisions on protocol extensions that might increase the risk of MEVil, we all need to get comfortable with this being how mining works in the future (and have some confidence we can get her, rather than where ethereum is). View quoted note →
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matt 1 year ago
If more complicated protocols become a major part of bitcoin's transactions, what the resulting MEVil looks like in practice is something we should all be clear about. @7d5x9 (from Twitter) and I sat down and wrote about the best (bad) solution we'd have if MEVil becomes big. In that world, complicated transaction construction algorithms would put immense pressure on mining centralization which, left to develop on their own, would drive horrible outcomes for Bitcoin. Instead, we propose the best idea we have - containing the damage to as small an area as possible by allowing the MEV(il) extractors to only bid for a small part of blockspace, leaving miners to pull from the public mempool for the rest. (It also enables more competition between MEV(il) extractors than ethereum's PBS by splitting the block space market into many smaller markets on a per-contract basis). It still represents a dramatic increase in centralization in the mining world, with marketplace centralization potentially allowing for exclusion of certain miners, but its way better than letting MEVil play out naturally.
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matt 1 year ago
Big day for long form writing for me today. Phew.