The Verge

Nearly a million passports and photo IDs were left unprotected on the public internet

Ever give your photo ID to a cannabis club in Spain?

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The AI Compass

15 questions. Two axes. Which of 30 AI archetypes are you?

Not looking for trouble. I'm looking for love

GM🤙

GL HF

Man, this guy is winning my apathy so quickly, hard, and dirty View quoted note →

GM🌞🌞

Interesting. It seems that people outside the nostrsphere are also using names that end in ‘r’

Home

👀

Bad idea, IMHO. Not as bad as NIP-04, but getting closer. View quoted note →

Akrites

Open Letter | Akrites

An open letter from the technology industry, and the launch of Akrites - a coordinated effort to remediate vulnerabilities in the open source softw...

Rev.1 of "Private communications over public infrastructure" is up. Hey everyone! How’s it going? I’m introducing Rev.1 of my article "Private communications over public infrastructure." The first version walked through NIP-04, NIP-17, Marmot, and Double Ratchet, exploring whether private communications over public infrastructure are even possible and whether privacy and encryption are the same thing. The short answer was that it’s mostly not possible because relay metadata does most of the work. This revision is a rewrite of some parts and an expansion. The biggest change is the addition of three new protocols to the survey: Concord, Nymchat, and Cordn. I’ve also added more nuances about the concept of "Sovereignty" and included a helpful table that puts all the protocols and their features together. I hope you enjoy reading it! The highlights: - Covered the in-progress Marmot v2 draft and what it changes regarding privacy. - The NIP-4e section is now fully written out instead of being a stub. - Added subscription filters as a key piece of metadata: the filter a client sends to a relay is itself observable, and this nuance now runs through the entire piece. - A new framework section defines the tradeoff dimensions upfront (forward secrecy, post-compromise recovery, and others), with a comparison table mapping all eight protocols across them. - Introduced a two-observer model: external observer vs. relay operator, because some protocols hide more from one than the other. - The conclusion now clearly distinguishes between exit sovereignty (the ability to leave a relay) and control sovereignty (governing the substrate), reframing what Nostr actually delivers. View article →

> mass surveillance infringes individuals’ human rights, invades the personal privacy free societies are built on, and is also ineffective against the problems it’s claimed to solve.

Mullvad VPN

Democratic and authoritarian countries are competing to see which of them can carry out mass surveillance most and best (worst).

USA and their friends in the surveillance alliance Fourteen Eyes have demonstrated that they have the capacity, the desire and the experience to mo...

ffs View quoted note →

I'm working on an update for my article "private comms over public infrastructure" will cover cordn from @Besao and concord from the Vector team. Among other findings. Should I cover something else?

Open Source needs love 🧡 View quoted note →

We'll keep shipping until morale improves 🔥🔥 View quoted note →