Chris Monetary Maximalist Eleutheropraxeology
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Sapere Aude!
Educate yourself, do not trust, verify and act accordingly.
Most importantly understand the individual uneasiness.
Question everything!
Study Eleutherology, Praxeology and BitCoin
Advanced Bitcoin Mantras
(from Bitcoiners for Bitcoiners):
Study BitCoin
Not your seed, not your UXTOs
Not your regular node, not your rules
Not your miner, not your network
Not your selected pool, not your defense
Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less system.
#Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
#Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block, unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
We are still in the struggle of two vision for the Bitcoin system:
-> One controlled by every node operator and highly decentralized. (nobody alone controls)
-> One controlled by a few very highly capitalized entity node operators and highly centralized.
(a committee controls)
What 2011 was called “fee death spiral problem” is nowadays renamed by “Bitcoin Security Budget”
The halving is the worse horror for highly indebted capitalized mining entities.
The difficulty adjustment the worse obstacle.
“Any […] miner intends to maximize profit. His decision on what transactions to include doesn’t create a big change in the height of fees. Thus, the miner will include all transactions that pay any fee, even very low fees, to have maximum profit.” Vandroiy
“This results in the price for transactions dropping. In turn, those miners who already were hardly profitable have their earnings further reduced and quit.” Vandroiy
That is “free competition”. And is very welcome to keep mining entities decentralized around the world.
A capitalist investing in mining activities with his/her own property has nothing to fear.
Good to read:
In these 14 years, the Bitcoin system has been showing that it can be a monetary alternative system. There’s no doubt about that.
What I’m more concerned is on the infrastructure level; i.e. the regular Bitcoin-nodes and mining-nodes decentralization.
Hayek and Bitcoin | The Daily Economy


