Here are the main contradictions between the Bitcoin Core relay statement (June 6, 2025) and the change to increase datacarrier/OP_RETURN up to ~100 KB:
Claim vs. effect on neutrality
Statement: Core developers say they are not in a position to mandate users’ policies and are just documenting a realistic relay policy.
Effect: Removing the datacarrier option and shipping a default of ~100 KB is an assertive policy change that effectively sets a new network-wide default for most node operators — functionally shaping usage and favoring larger-data transactions. That makes the project an active policy actor despite the “we don’t mandate” language.
“Not endorsing non-financial data” vs. making it easier
Statement: “This is not endorsing or condoning non-financial data usage…”
Effect: By increasing default permitted OP_RETURN size and deprecating -datacarrier, Core makes storing large non-financial payloads easier and more broadly relayed/mined, which in practice enables and normalizes those use cases.
“Avoid auto-updating” and user choice vs. imposing defaults
Statement: They cite avoiding auto-updating as evidence users choose their software and policies.
Effect: Changing defaults in the widely-distributed reference client (and deprecating a flag) effectively imposes that default on a large portion of users who run the reference client and rely on its defaults — reducing practical choice unless operators explicitly change behavior or run forks.
“DoS protection and fee assessment” rationale vs. increased blockspace risk
Statement: Relay-policy changes are justified for DoS protection, fee estimation, block propagation, and miner coordination.
Effect: Allowing much larger datacarrier payloads increases the risk of large low-fee data-bearing transactions (spam) that could harm propagation, increase DoS surface, and complicate fee estimation — which contradicts the stated protective goals unless paired with strong fee/DoS mitigations (not obvious in the statement).
“Prevent forcing users into alternate channels” vs. centralization pressure
Statement: Refusing to relay transactions miners will include forces users into alternate channels.
Effect: The change assumes miners will accept large-data transactions; if miners are a minority who do so, non-upgrading nodes that refuse large-data relay are the ones pressured. But because most miners already accept large transactions, shipping a Core default that aligns with miners privileges the miner-majority path and marginalizes conservative node operators — the statement’s neutrality claim conflicts with this implicit alignment.
Technical neutrality vs. policy impact without consensus
Statement: Changes are framed as non-consensus, policy-only, leaving consensus untouched.
Effect: Though not a consensus rule, widely adopted policy defaults can materially change what gets mined and stored on-chain. Presenting the change as harmless “policy” understates its systemic impact.
“Aligning with miners’ rational self-interest” vs. long-term network health tradeoffs
Statement: Relay rules will align with miners’ rational self-interest and long-term health.
Effect: Miner short-term incentives (accept fees now) can differ from long-term node-operator interests (preserving blockspace for payments). Making defaults that favor immediate miner acceptance may contradict the claim that the change serves long-term health.
Summary (one-sentence): The statement frames the change as neutral, non‑endorsement, and user-choice preserving, while the datacarrier increase to ~100 KB and deprecation of the flag are active default-setting moves that enable large arbitrary-data use, change practical incentives, and therefore conflict with the stated neutral/limited role and DoS-protection justifications.

Bitcoin Core
Bitcoin Core development and transaction relay policy
Bitcoin Core development and transaction relay policy