#GrapheneOS version 2026010800 released. • raise declared patch level to 2026-01-05 which has been provided since we moved to Android 16 QPR2 in December due to Pixels shipping CVE-2025-54957 in December • re-enable the system keyboard at boot if it's disabled • switch to the system keyboard when device boots to the Safe Mode • add "Reboot to Safe Mode" power menu button in Before First Unlock state to make Safe Mode much more discoverable for working around app issues such as a broken third party keyboard • add workaround for upstream UsageStatsDatabase OOM system_server crash • add workaround for upstream WindowContext.finalize() system_server crash • disable buggy upstream disable_frozen_process_wakelocks feature causing system_server crashes for some users • Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer: fix phenotype flags not working in Play services clients • Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer: add MEDIA_CONTENT_CONTROL as a requested permission for Android Auto as part of our toggles for it to avoid needing to grant the far more invasive notification access permission • Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer: extend opt-in Android Auto Bluetooth support to allow A2dpService.setConnectionPolicy() to fix Bluetooth functionality (previously worked around with a GmsCompatConfig update avoiding a crash) • switch to new upstream PackageInstallerUI implementation added in Android 16 QPR2 and port our changes to it • update SQLite to 3.50.6 LTS release • add an extra layer of USB port protection on 10th gen Pixels based on upstream functionality to replace our USB gadget control which was causing compatibility issues with the Pixel 10 USB drivers • allow SystemUI to access NFC service on 10th gen Pixels to fix the NFC quick tile • disable the upstream Android USB data protection feature since it conflicts with our more advanced approach and causes issues • issue CHARGING_ONLY_IMMEDIATE port control command in more cases • fix an issue in our infrastructure for spoofing permission self-checks breaking automatically reading SMS one-time codes for certain apps • add workaround for upstream KeySetManagerService system_server crash causing a user to be stuck on an old OS version due to it causing a boot failure when booting a the new OS version after updating • wipe DPM partition on 10th gen Pixels as part of installation as we do on earlier Pixels since it's always meant to be zeroed on production devices • Settings: disable indexing of the unsupported "Parental controls" setting which is not currently available in AOSP • Settings: disable redundant indexing of widgets on lockscreen contents which is already indexed another way • skip all pseudo kernel crash reports caused by device reboot to avoid various false positive crash reports • Vanadium: update to version 143.0.7499.192.0 All of the Android 16 security patches from the current January 2026, February 2026, March 2026, April 2026, May 2026 and June 2026 Android Security Bulletins are included in the 2026010801 security preview release. List of additional fixed CVEs: • High: CVE-2025-32348, CVE-2025-48561, CVE-2025-48615, CVE-2025-48630, CVE-2025-48641, CVE-2025-48642, CVE-2025-48644, CVE-2025-48645, CVE-2025-48646, CVE-2025-48649, CVE-2025-48652, CVE-2025-48653, CVE-2026-0014, CVE-2026-0015, CVE-2026-0016, CVE-2026-0017, CVE-2026-0018, CVE-2026-0020, CVE-2026-0021, CVE-2026-0022, CVE-2026-0023, CVE-2026-0024, CVE-2026-0025

Releases | GrapheneOS

Would be cool to use with #GrapheneOS. You are free to use their portable wireless charger with keyboard or even their Pixel 9 phone case. I recommend the former because you can still use it with USB disabled.

Clicks Power Keyboard: One keyboard. All your smart screens.

Clicks Power Keyboard is a premium bluetooth keyboard and power bank that fits in your pocket bringing tactile typing to your phone, tablet, smart ...

Happy new year everyone! In 2025 GrapheneOS implemented: - A network location provider for highly reliable location position without using Google's service and a geocoding service. - Support for Android 16, QPR1 and QPR2 after Google's removal of device support and releases for all current Pixel devices. - Heavily improved our automated porting tooling and server infrastructure. - Our first security preview releases allowing users to recieve embargoed security patches for Critical/High CVEs a few months before stock Android. - Closed out some VPN leaks from Android. - Enabling experimental support for the developer option Terminal virtual machine manager app and other features like GUI support. - Several improvements to Private Spaces, including use in secondary users, ending session for them, and installing available apps. - Established a ASN for GrapheneOS and a highly reliable and widespread global network for GrapheneOS services. This year should have some significant improvements with GrapheneOS, especially on the usage and accessibility front. There is also a lot of future Android features that will be key in delivering this, such as a fully working Desktop Mode. May this year wish us well.

Needs to be greater support for tablets by Android devs. UIs designed for the big screen also help with Desktop Mode.

This is either a very hot or a very reasoned take and I am quoting my previous note for being potentially related but I'm not a fan of software choices being grouped together or categorised for certain types of people. If you are using something only because a forum or a thread on social media told you to, then you are more of a sheep than the people using the platforms you are moving away from are. The latter are at least doing it out of a personal preference, not out of being alternative or contrarian. You don't need to be hardcore and use something that sticks to a specific social group. Don't ask what the best of something is, ask WHY it is. Learn about the subject and see critically and you'll always find what the best project is for you. Don't walk in other people's shoes. Research skills is everything. Read more. I think I read too little. I once read a post off platform a while ago about how someone felt wrong leaving GrapheneOS to use something else because of (very justifiable) personal reasons to support their needs. The fact someone would feel really ashamed and negative that they aren't meeting some imposed values from some social group (over a software choice) is not okay. You can use and build what you want. This isn't purity testing. It comes across as a deeply toxic relationship between users. View quoted note →

We're developing our own implementations of text-to-speech and speech-to-text to use in #GrapheneOS which are entirely open source and avoid using so-called 'open' models without the training data available. Instead, we're making a truly open source implementation of both where all of the data used for it is open source. If you don't want to use our app for local text-to-speech and speech-to-text then you don't need to use it. Many people need this and want a better option. We are working on TTS first then SST. The TTS training data is LJ Speech

The LJ Speech Dataset

A public domain speech dataset consisting of 13,100 short audio clips of a single speaker reading passages from 7 non-fiction books. A transcriptio...

and the model used is our own fork of Matcha-TTS. If people want they can fork it and add/remove/change the training data in any way they see fit. It's nothing like the so-called "open" models from OpenAI, Facebook, etc. where the only thing that's open are the neural network weights after training with no way to know what they used to train it and no way to reproduce that. Many blind users asked us to include one of the existing open source TTS apps so they could use it to obtain a better app. None of the available open source apps meets our requirements for reasonable licensing, privacy, security or functionality. Therefore, we've developed our own text-to-speech which will be shipping soon, likely in January. We'll also be providing our own speech-to-text. We're using neural networks for both which we're making ourselves.

Merry Christmas

update: I'm an idiot and that is meant to be a Star of David not a pentagram (why the fuck is it red?) View quoted note →

(at the satanist conference) Alright guys we made the mobile operating system now all we need to do is set up THE CLUES

Next #GrapheneOS update will remove the messy End Session button in the lock screen of secondary users. You'll be able to end session within the power menu or the user profile switcher UI instead. Placing in the power button menu also means you're able to choose to power off in the same place, which could be a valuable protective measure greater than ending the session of the current profile.

Had seen news that a mobile phone centered around a different cryptocurrency had been announced as end of life (no security updates) after just two years. Please just use a commercial off the shelf device from a reputable brand and long support time. OS updates is not driver, firmware, etc. Even if it is a 'Bitcoin phone' it's likely not the best or safest phone a Bitcoiner should use.

View quoted note →

#GrapheneOS is very distinct from other Android distributions and OEM configurations. There is a litany of Linux kernel and Android Runtime hardening changes and features powering GrapheneOS. This is very significant but often overlooked because most changes aren't visible to the end user. The leading example of this is hardened_malloc, the hardened memory allocator used in GrapheneOS to protect against memory corruption vulnerabilities. You can find a technical article about it by Synacktiv, a French cyber security company:

Synacktiv

Exploring GrapheneOS secure allocator: Hardened Malloc

Exploring GrapheneOS secure allocator: Hardened Malloc

Hardening in GrapheneOS are built on closing out commonly exploited attack surfaces, substituting them with more secure replacements, or giving them stronger security defaults. If you are a blue teamer you'll already be familiar with the Pyramid of Pain: For newcomers, this model is a layered pyramid that ranks indicators of compromise by a linear level of difficulty and cost for the threat actor to evade security measures to perform an attack; The bottom of the pyramid being very easy and trivial for the threat actor to change and the top being tough. This model opens newcomers on how good security strategy is built: Techniques and capabilities over individual actors. Closing out tactics, techniques and procedures are far more important than blocking an IP address or a file hash. You want to protect against a type of attack, not against a particular actor who performs them. The point of having extensive hardening features is that we need to ensure vulnerabilities that would affect Android are benign, harder to exploit or patched in GrapheneOS before they can be exploited. Android distributions carry the weight of vulnerabilities from upstream. To reduce that weight, we need to make sure a highly sophisticated exploit developer would have to uniquely design their exploit to target GrapheneOS, should they be able to at all. Without that, GrapheneOS wouldn't be special. It would not be sensible to claim it is more security and privacy focused than Android if it was able to be exploited through the exact same mechanisms with little or no effort needed to port. An Android distribution that is just Android without Google services is mostly as exploitable as Android. Something that is "DeGoogled" (I don't use the term, it's Reddit tier buzzword nonsense) may not necessarily be safer to use either. To earn the title of being hardened it needs more, but this isn't ever implemented well enough. Projects that have done so to the best of their ability also have died (DivestOS). Our hardening features are available outside of GrapheneOS. Leading example of this is secureblue, a security hardened Linux distribution (https://secureblue.dev/) which is using hardened_malloc and Vanadium inspired chromium browser. A business also sells hardened Rocky Linux supporting hardened_malloc. If you are a maintainer of a leading project then implementing our hardening features and supporting is strongly encouraged.

Defenestrate social media marketers using HDR in their ads

We've received a 2nd IPv4 /24 subnet from ARIN for our 2nd anycast DNS network. Both our /24 subnets were obtained quickly under the NRPM 4.10 policy for IPv6 deployment for our dual stack DNS use case. 2nd was obtained without waiting 6 months due to being a discrete network. We host our own authoritative DNS servers to provide DNS resolution for our services. Authoritative DNS are the servers queried by DNS resolvers run by your ISP, VPN or an explicitly user chosen one such as Cloudflare or Quad9 DNS. We now have our own AS and IP space for this. Our ns1 has 11 locations on Vultr: New York City, Miami, Los Angeles, Seattle, London, Frankfurt, Singapore, Mumbai, Tokyo, Sao Paulo and Sydney. Our ns2 has 4 locations on BuyVM: New York City, Miami, Las Vegas and Bern. We'll be adding a 2nd server provider for more locations. DNS resolvers quickly fall back to the other network if traffic is dropped. Having two discrete networks with separate hosting companies and transit providers provides very high reliability. Individual servers which go down also stop having traffic routed to them due to BGP. We have tiny #GrapheneOS website/network servers and also powerful update mirrors around the world. Our DNS servers use a combination of a GeoIP database and their own location to route users to the closest server that's up. Frequent health checks and low expiry time handle server downtime.