final [GrapheneOS] ๐Ÿ“ฑ๐Ÿ‘๏ธโ€๐Ÿ—จ๏ธ's avatar
final [GrapheneOS] ๐Ÿ“ฑ๐Ÿ‘๏ธโ€๐Ÿ—จ๏ธ
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Keeping the fight. Community Moderator for #GrapheneOS https://discuss.grapheneos.org/u/final This is a personal account. I do not speak on behalf of GrapheneOS developers as a whole (nor am I) and suggestions shall not be endorsements.
I consider being able to make a web page something a young person should attempt to do, preferably in school. Learn the basics of HTML, CSS and you can pretty much make a small site about anything. You see a website that looks cool? The markup is your documentation. Read the HTML and look at the styles. Teens seem to love one-page site links for their social media like Carrd, I think it would be the next level for them. It doesn't matter if it's ass to begin with, you make better pages as you keep making different sites. After I discovered static site generation then the work flow improvements was marvelous.
GM! ๐Ÿ”ฅ #GrapheneOS version 2024012600 is out with several #security enhancements and improvements to eSIMs. See the changes! - isolate eSIM activation app from non-system apps to avoid it sharing data with sandboxed Google Play - make eSIM activation toggle available without sandboxed Google Play installed - make the eSIM activation app toggle persistent instead of it being disabled at boot - remove misleading message about device info being sent to Google message before eSIM download - hardened_malloc: use tag 0 for freed slots instead of reserving a tag to allow using 15 of 16 possible tag values for random tags (there are 3 dynamic exclusions of the random values for the previous tag along with the 2 current or previous adjacent tags) - Settings: prevent disabling Camera2/CameraX extension provider app (Pixel Camera Services for Pixels) since it breaks apps using CameraX - kernel (Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro, Pixel 6a, Pixel 7, Pixel 7 Pro, Pixel 7a, Pixel Tablet, Pixel Fold, Pixel 8, Pixel 8 Pro): use a normal reboot on overheating instead of an emergency reboot to harden against physical attacks - kernel: enable reset attack mitigation for UEFI systems supporting it (Tensor Pixels use minimalistic littlekernel-based boot firmware rather than UEFI and the previous Snapdragon Pixels using UEFI didn't implement this but we may need this for future devices) - kernel (Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro, Pixel 6a, Pixel 7, Pixel 7 Pro, Pixel 7a, Pixel Tablet, Pixel Fold, Generic 5.10): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 5.10.208 - kernel (Pixel 8, Pixel 8 Pro, Generic 5.15): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 5.15.147 - kernel (Generic 6.1): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.1.73 - Launcher: disable gradient at the top of the home screen again (change lost with Android 14 QPR1 due to it being reimplemented upstream) - rewrite HTTPS network time implementation to make it much more maintainable and robust along with providing better debug output via ADB - Vanadium: update to version 121.0.6167.101.1 - GmsCompatConfig: update to version 93 Seedvault: update to latest revision (will be replaced with a better backup implementation in the future)
Next #GrapheneOS update now includes some hardening against reset attacks to prevent potential ways of bypassing our memory zeroing features. This is a response to the exploit we previously reported to Google of forensics companies exploiting a RAM dump from fastboot firmware to brute force OS credentials in Pixels running the stock OS. While not suggested to affect GrapheneOS nor should a user be concerned, this will be an additional security enhancement for our users anyways. Thermal reboots are unsafe reboots that don't erase memory safely. They have now been changed to perform safe shutdowns instead. It stops a threat with physical access and RAM dump capabilities from overheating the phone to force an unsafe reboot into fastboot. A reset attack protection mechanism has been enabled for supported UEFI systems. While we don't support devices using UEFI or the UEFI reset attack protection mechanism, it could come useful in later devices. These protections will be one of multiple to kill the capability for good. Read about the original exploit on my post on stacker news:
#GrapheneOS has developed changes with eSIM management to help eSIM users: - eSIM management will no longer require Sandboxed Google Play. - eSIM management binaries are isolated from Google Play services. - Nor will they make direct connections to Google via Google Play Services to activate eSIMs. See the current upcoming change at:
GM! #GrapheneOS Vanadium version 121.0.6167.101.0 is available in Alpha, and will be pushed to later release channels soon. Changes: - update to Chromium 121.0.6167.101 - replace high entropy client hints with placeholders from the frozen user agent (form factor as Mobile, device model as K, platform version as Android 10 and a reduced version number with zero for the minor parts) to improve compatibility with problematic bot detection checks while not providing any additional information - raise minimum API level to 33 (Android 13) from the default API level 29 (Android 10) to reduce the work required for our upcoming features See all upcoming changes here:
There is no perfect email provider. You cannot provide perfect service to a deeply flawed communication method. Companies like Skiff, Proton Mail and Tuta are good email providers, but not providers that make emails good. Each one has limitations. These companies should intend to provide you a good service that won't sell you out and make an effort to see the least information they can while following their laws, and they use the encryption and security measures to ensure that. That is what makes the 'Encrypted' in encrypted email important. The end to end encryption for emails is a good bonus but if you're using it for your accounts... it's sadly not worth anything since none of these company sites will bother with encrypting their mail. PGP is also a usability and implementation nightmare. Encryption should be the default and always.
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