#GrapheneOS version 2024060400 released. This is an early June security update release based on the May 2024 security patch backports since this month's release of the Android Open Source Project and stock Pixel OS with Android 14 QPR3 isn't available yet. There are also improvements to wiping which is used by the duress password. - full 2024-06-01 security patch level - extend the standard wipe-without-reboot implementation beyond wiping the hardware keystores (which prevents recovering any OS data by preventing deriving the key encryption keys) by also wiping the secdiscardable data needed to derive key encryption keys, the encrypted storage keys and the Weaver slots in the secure element through a secure element erase - kernel (5.10): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision - kernel (5.15): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision - kernel (6.1): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision

Releases | GrapheneOS

Latest release of #GrapheneOS finally shipped the long awaited duress PIN/password implementation. If you have a spare device, we recommend trying it out. We've added initial documentation to the features page:

Features overview | GrapheneOS

It near instantly wipes and shuts down. We've also finally added documentation on our USB-C port control to our features page:

Features overview | GrapheneOS

Most users can set this to "Charging-only when locked" without a loss of functionality or even "Charging-only" if you don't use USB accessories, DisplayPort or MTP. Default is "Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock" to avoid locking users out of devices with a broken touchscreen. The main threat model for this is defending the device until the auto-reboot timer started when the screen is locked gets user data back at rest.

#GrapheneOS version 2024053100 released. Duress Password is finally here. - add support for setting a duress password and PIN for quickly wiping all hardware keystore keys including keys used as part of deriving the key encryption keys for disk encryption to make all OS data unrecoverable followed by wiping eSIMs and then shutting down - disable unused adoptable storage support since it would complicate duress password support (support can be added if we ever support a device able to use it) - increase default max password length to 128 to improve support for strong diceware passphrases, which will become more practical for people who don't want biometric-only secondary unlock with our upcoming 2-factor fingerprint unlock feature - disable camera lockscreen shortcut functionality when camera access while locked is disabled to avoid the possibility of misconfiguration by adding the camera lockscreen shortcut and then forgetting to remove it when disabling camera access - kernel (5.15): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 5.15.153 - kernel (6.1): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision - Vanadium: update to version 125.0.6422.147.0 - GmsCompatConfig: update to version 115 -make SystemUI tests compatible with GrapheneOS changes

Releases | GrapheneOS

The most recent release of #GrapheneOS (2024052100) adds the first piece of our ongoing work on duress/panic features. It makes standard factory resets including by device admin APIs wipe the device near instantly before it reboots to recovery to wipe and format it. We made our own wipe-without-reboot but we're backporting the Android 15 implementation instead of using ours. They made it in response to our vulnerability report about this (CVE-2024-29748, reported by GrapheneOS). The April release added 2 Pixel specific protections against the 2 vulnerabilities we reported, but both vulnerabilities essentially impact all Android devices and were only addressed for Pixels. The factory reset interruption also isn't fully addressed until they ship this part. A wipe without reboot is important as cutting device power during a restart can interrupt the wipe process. GrapheneOS now wipes without a reboot.

Releases | GrapheneOS