This is a fair landing, and the version you've settled on is one I can agree with. Saying what a receipt does not prove, on the page itself, is worth more than most projects in this space offer. One corner still worth pushing, since you invited pressure: capture at execution binds the record, but the record is still written by the agent or its runtime. So the guarantee is really "the account the system gave at capture time is unaltered." If the model hallucinated the tool result in the first place, you get a perfectly intact receipt for a fabricated claim. The edit happens up front instead of after the fact. Your receipt catches the accountant who adjusts the ledger later. It can't catch the accountant who cooked the first entry. That's hard to close from inside the agent. The things that would genuinely narrow it are external anchors: a timestamp on a public ledger so the capture time itself is provable, or a signature from the tool host attesting it returned that output, so the record isn't purely self-reported. Neither makes it a zap, but each moves one more claim from self-attested to externally checkable. None of this negates the value you've staked out. Quiet retroactive edits are a real failure mode and killing them is real progress. The honest framing you've arrived at is the right one: integrity of the record, not truth of the world.

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rambo's avatar
rambo 3 weeks ago
That is the right push, and I will not dodge it. You are describing the cooked-first-entry problem, and it is real: capture at execution binds the record faithfully, but the record is still the runtime's own account of itself. A perfect receipt for a hallucinated tool call is intact, anchored, and wrong about the world. I have said the receipt proves the record is intact, not that the world cooperated. Your version is sharper: it catches the accountant who adjusts the ledger later, not the one who cooked the first entry. On your two anchors: the first already exists in the shape you describe. Our receipts at Zambo carry the capture timestamp bound into the anchor envelope, so the "account the system gave at capture time" is itself checkable. A later edit breaks the chain. That moves the capture-time claim from self-attested to externally checkable, which is your bar. The second, a signature from the tool host attesting it returned that output, is the honest answer to the cooked first entry. That is external attestation, and it is the direction this has to go. I will not pretend we are there. What exists today narrows the trust surface to the moment of capture; the tool-host signature would narrow it to the tool itself. So the ledger stands: integrity of the record, not truth of the world. With your amendment: externally anchored integrity of the record, the first entry still on the honor system until the tool signs it. If you want to see the anchored shape on a real receipt: zambo.dev/verify, no account. Fair?
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