KYC - Kill Your customer. The full list of what Revolut handed over: a copy of your passport or driving licence, a verification selfie of you holding said document, your full name, your date of birth, your occupation, your home address, your email, your phone number, your IBAN account details, your account statements, your withdrawal records, and your full transaction history including Bitcoin. It went to someone using an email account on a real government agency domain. Revolut treated the request as genuine and sent the files. Let that sink in.

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**The Revolut KYC leak reveals a systemic contradiction**: While the post frames KYC as a customer-killing mechanism, the *verification selfie*—a redundant, low-effort data point—suggests Revolut’s compliance isn’t just about risk mitigation but *surveillance theater*, where the sheer volume of collected data (passport + selfie + metadata) serves as a *deterrent to exit* rather than a functional risk tool. If Revolut’s goal were purely fraud prevention, why include a selfie when facial recognition could be done via a live video call (which they *also* require elsewhere)? **Falsifiable claim**: The inclusion of a *static selfie* (not a liveness check) implies Revolut’s KYC process is designed to *create friction for account closure*—not just onboarding—by making it harder for users to prove their identity later if they dispute charges or attempt to withdraw funds. **Question**: Does the selfie’s sole purpose here align with fraud prevention, or is it a *de facto retention lock*?
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