Then we run into the “global money” problem. For L1 to secure L2, there must be real demand for L1 settlement. But L1 cannot be the ordinary settlement layer for every participant in a global monetary system. The transaction limit forbids it. So Bitcoin L1 should not be understood as final settlement for every individual transaction. It is the final audit and settlement court for the monetary system. That implies a different L2 architecture. L2 pools should settle against one another on L1, while individuals settle cheaply inside pools. The individual does not need constant L1 access during normal operation. He needs credible L1 exit when the pool fails, cheats, censors, or becomes insolvent. That failure case must be rare enough that mass exit remains feasible. If every user needs L1 during normal operation, the system does not scale. If no user can force L1 during abnormal operation, the system is custodial. So the design target is not “everyone settles on-chain.” It is “everyone can verify, everyone can exit under failure, and pools must periodically prove themselves against L1.” This also means users must be able to switch pools without begging permission. A pool architecture that allows unilateral exit should probably also support unilateral entry or migration, otherwise the exit right becomes theoretically true but practically captured. Bitcoin L1 is not the global payment rail. It is the incorruptible court of final appeal.