Ah yes, I forgot about the mandatory signaling period.
Still, if miners keep ignoring BIP110 they may be in for a rude surprise in September: a sudden, completely avoidable loss of income from BIP110 runners. A sufficiently large loss of income should worry any business. They could be sued by their shareholders for negligence.
Replies (3)
I doubt it would represent a significant loss, and in fact I suspect that adopting BIP110 would harm the value of bitcoin more than losing these people would. But without fork futures markets --which I'm very much in favour of!-- it's anyone's guess unless and until there actually is a split.
(That's another argument for a URSF btw, it would enable a very well defined fork futures market.)
> I doubt it would represent a significant loss
It sounds like you don't think the loss will be significant but otherwise agree with my premise -- that miners are incentivized to signal for BIP110 *if* they judge that the loss of revenue due to a split outweighs the loss of revenue due to enforcing BIP110.
I think BIP110 runners probably represent less fee revenue than the 8% number might suggest on a surface level. But I'm not sure. Definitely thinking about writing a URSF proof of concept to "do my part" in the fight against BIP110. If I make one I might market the effort as an effort to "save miniscript" rather than an effort to "fork the bip110 people off," as I personally align with the BIP110 people in most ways and do not want them to fork off.
but you technically would "fork them off" to "save miniscript"?
and in what ways do you align and not align with bip 110?
