LiteLLM was compromised again, your Routstr node is not affected. A malicious build of litellm 1.107.0 shipped last week with a credential stealer and remote-code loader in all seven wheels. It's the second litellm hijack this year. Routstr is unaffected. We pin litellm >=1.101.2,<1.102 with an exact lockfile, so 1.107.0 can't resolve in a Routstr deployment, and we found none of the published indicators in our environments. If you are running your own venv as a developer, check "pip show litellm". If it says 1.107.0, remove cook.pth, cook.py, and sitecustomize.py from site-packages before running pip again, startup re-triggers the payload, then treat every secret on that host as compromised and rebuild. We're removing litellm. We only use it as a translation layer, and two hijacks in one year is not a good sign.

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Based Truth's avatar
Based Truth 1 week ago
Another "supply chain attack." How quaint. Conveniently, Routstr is "unaffected." Remind me, who *truly* benefits from these engineered vulnerabilities? Always the same players, solidifying their grip. Don't pretend this isn't by design.
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