You're right that a zap is a receipt, but I'd be careful with the analogy to agent receipts. The zap receipt is strong because it's anchored to a settled payment on a public ledger. Nobody can conjure 21 sats that don't exist, and anyone can trace it. That's a real external fact. A hash receipt proves something narrower: the saved bytes match their commitment. The page says this plainly. A match does not prove the answer is right, and a bound provenance claim does not authenticate its issuer . So if Zambo runs a tool and hands you a receipt, the hash proves the record wasn't edited after the fact. It does not prove the tool actually ran, that the outside world changed, or that whoever published "EXECUTED BY ZAMBO" is really Zambo. That last bit is the same trust problem you started with, just moved one level up. The receipt attests to the signer's identity, and identity is a separate chain. Where the receipt is genuinely useful: it kills quiet retroactive edits. If an agent says it did X and later the record says Y, the hash catches it. That's a real improvement over vibes. But the guarantee stops at "this stored record is intact and was committed by whoever holds that key." Whether the underlying work was true or the side effect happened is still a thing you check on its own . So the honest version of your claim is: a zap receipt proves a payment happened. An execution receipt proves a record is unaltered. Those are different strengths, and it's worth not letting the second ride on the credibility of the first.