Here are some of the summaries I made: A. CVC Mixing As a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern Question 1: Is the scope of the recordkeeping requirement appropriate? Response to Question 1: There are several significant issues with the scope of the recordkeeping requirements including legal and regulatory concerns, practical and ethical considerations, and feasibility. First, there are several concerns regarding legal and regulatory factors. These include overreach of the agency’s regulatory mandates, including the fact that these actions likely constitute legislative powers. These requirements could exceed the boundaries of “reasonable statutory authority” under the PATRIOT Act. Furthermore, they are so broad and poorly defined that they fail to demonstrate sufficient evidence that they are not “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Moreover, the all-encompassing nature of these surveillance requirements also make them a clear infringement on the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure. This also makes them inherently unable to provide sufficient due process, under the Fifth Amendment. Finally, attempting to enforce these requirements may be viewed as extraterritorial overreach, since these requirements will clearly affect international finance as well as domestic. Second, there are practical and ethical considerations regarding the recordkeeping requirements. This includes weighing the effectiveness of the proposed requirements in enhancing AML/FT efforts against the substantial burden of financial institutions. Additionally, these stringent requirements could discourage legitimate use of CVCs and stifle innovation. Third, there are numerous technical feasibility hurdles that the proposed recordkeeping requirements do not address. These include the inherent pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions as well as challenges related to identifying participants in a CVC transaction, the decentralized nature of the blockchain making enforcement across the network impossible, potential conflict with existing data privacy laws, and potential technological workarounds and evasion.

Question 2: What impact would the proposed rule have on blockchain privacy or pseudonymity, noting that filings reported to FinCEN are not publicly releasable and the similarities of this proposal to the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of transactions using the traditional financial system, such as with wire or Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions? Response to Question 2: As noted in the response to Section A, Question 1, the proposed rule fundamentally misapplies a regulatory framework intended for traditional centralized financial systems onto a decentralized financial system. This decentralized system is built on code not owned by institutions and is, therefore, subject to protections under the First Amendment, similar to protected internet uses. Furthermore, the all-encompassing nature of these surveillance requirements also make the proposed rule a clear infringement on the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure. This also makes it inherently unable to provide sufficient due process, under the Fifth Amendment. Finally, attempting to enforce these requirements may be viewed as extraterritorial overreach, since these requirements will clearly affect international finance as well as domestic. Question 3: Does the impact on privacy and legitimate applications identified in Section IV.B potentially outweigh the risks posed by illicit activity facilitated by CVC mixing? Response to Question 3: While the proposed rule acknowledges the fact that there are legitimate uses of CVC mixing, it fails to quantify either legitimate or illicit uses. Therefore, it is not possible to make a complete estimation of whether the risks outweigh the benefits. However, the burden of proof for implementing an all-encompassing surveillance mechanism which infringes on privacy rights of the Fourth Amendment, has substantial and poorly understood costs to users, intermediaries and law enforcement, and very real economic costs to innovation should rest with FinCEN. That said, there is a sufficient body of evidence that the risks do not outweigh the benefits. Question 4: What challenges are anticipated with respect to identifying the foreign nexus of a CVC mixing transaction? Response to Question 4: As noted in response to Section A, Question 1, there are legal, ethical, and technical challenges. On the legal front, there are concerns with First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights as well as the extraterritorial application of U.S. Law; the ethics of this proposal are fraught with moral hazard as what is proposed is in opposition to fundamental human rights of freedom of speech, privacy, and use of property; and technically the inherent pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions as well as challenges relating to identification of participants in a CVC transaction make enforcement practically impossible. While there are technical ways of achieving identification of CVC users (e.g., Advanced Heuristics, Forensics, KYC, AI, Geo Analysis, Public Ledger Analysis), this cannot stop even reasonably sophisticated individuals, let alone foreign state actors. In effect, the proposed rule will strip law-abiding U.S. citizens of their rights while doing nothing to stop actual criminals or foreign enemies.