The problem I see with this design is that the server has to do L1 transaction + commit to locking funds up for possible time period without assurance from user that they will pay lightning invoice. I may be misunderstanding.
These problems could be mitigated with a fee that has to be played before the L1 transaction but I would like to hear your ideas for mitigation @Super Testnet
Thanks! Very interesting idea!
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Yup, this is a general unsolved problem with submarine swaps: the party with the timelock path can be grieved by abandoning the swap after the name the L1 deposit. They lose atwo mining fees and make no money.
I think a fidelity bond paid via LN can help here. If you compete the swap, you trust the server to give you the bond money back. If you abandon the swap, the server keeps the bond money to reimburse their two mining fees.