China Morning Missive
Wuwei (无为) and the Cultural Chasm
Over the past several days I’ve been overwhelmed with client emails asking whether American activities in the Gulf are indirectly targeting China. It appears that the zeitgeist, including many Washington policy makers, is operating under the impression that China has been irreparably harmed and the Beijing leadership is at a loss for how to respond. My responses to those emails are short and to the point. “Ignore the noise. We’ve seen similar instances in the past (last year’s tariff episode?). Operate under the principal that China has prepared for this eventuality.”
It continues to escape the rationale mind of many that China operates at the lowest possible time preference. I make this point often and do so because it represents the singular first principal to be applied whenever any assessment of China is being made. Not only is the application critical to understand how Beijing goes about structuring policies, both domestic and foreign, it is central to the very process of decision making itself. More specifically, the importance lies in a recognition that, for Beijing, action is far more often found in demonstrable restraint.
There are genuine cultural anomalies present. They need to be considered and yet are always absent. Honestly, you’d think this would have been recognized by now given thirty years of observable Chinese behavior. It hasn’t. There isn’t just a cultural gap in America’s expert class when it comes to the topic of China, there is a cultural chasm.
Be it the Taoist concept of Wuwei or the teachings of Lao Tzu, Chinese society is grounded in a willingness to take the path of forbearance. An outward projection of stillness. Consider the character for patience, Ren (忍). It is comprised of two characters, blade (刃) and heart (心). What this means to the Chinese is that patience is a concept that requires a willingness to endure adversity.
Be mindful though. Non-action shouldn’t always be taken literally. It is a highly layered construct and quite malleable. Yes, the Chinese default setting is a static state, but every single event is viewed through its own unique lens. If there were to be an extreme event, then the Beijing leadership would most certainly resort to an immediate response. To the Chinese, however, there is rarely ever an occurrence that is truly extreme (ie unexpected) in nature.
Restraint is the consequence of ongoing preparedness present across China. At all levels of society, anxiety is born from uncertainty and the greater the uncertainty the greater the anxiety. And to counter uncertainty means a greater effort to prepare. Again, we only need to look back to last year. Contrary to all American expectations, the Chinese successfully countered the Trump administration’s escalatory tariff regime. This was achieved through advanced preparation. It was a widely held view in China that tariffs would be deployed and parties across the country simply planned well in advance for that eventuality. Exports were frontloaded and cash hoards were amassed. This provided time and flexibility to negotiate and do so from a position of relative strength.
So too is it the case with events now playing out in the Middle East. Beijing has well understood, and for decades, America’s motivations and objectives across the Gulf and preparations have been underway for quite some time. Beijing made overtures to create a separate series of regional relationships and did so with success. At the same time, there were various steps taken to mitigate all identified risks from future conflict. There was the aggressive campaign to build three significant rail lines (and pipelines) traversing the entirety of the Heartland. Alternative sources of energy (ex-Gulf partners) were established, from Russia to Indonesia to Africa. Even the domestic agenda of shifting to renewables and EVs can now be seen as having a geopolitical angle. China isn’t at a loss. China is, once again, very well placed.
If there is to be a focus, it needs to be on a fundamental realignment in how the American foreign policy and business community goes about assessing China. This must begin by taking China seriously and literally. Stop miscalculating China’s capabilities. Secretary Bessent famously claimed last year that China was negotiating “with a pair of twos”. He was wrong. Today, Secretary Wright is stating that “China is about to lose the second of three gas station suppliers”. Again, the Secretary will come to learn that he, too, is wrong. The script must be flipped and, moving forward, it is highly advisable that the expectation shift towards China gaining from hegemonic actions taken by America.
