I’m just getting to the part of fiat currency secondary effects in
@LynAlden's Broken Money book where we’re talking about the politics of fiat currency. So pleased to find I’m in good company with what I’ve been hammering home (to anybody who’ll listen—sorry
@poorbaldmonkey) about democratic decision-making and fiat currency. Here’s a great excerpt, and one I urge pro-democracy reform folks to take heed of:
“The goal for this whole process is for the money supply to grow at a smooth and moderate pace, without big contractions or big accelerations that destructively feed on themselves. The peaks and troughs of the private sector are dulled, and external shocks are smoothed over—or at least, that’s the plan.
This theory works well on paper, assuming that government and central bank officials are more detached, intelligent, and/or long-term in their thinking than people in the private sector in aggregate, or at least that their incentives are more aligned with long-term planning. A problem obviously arises if they are not, and realistically, that’s usually the case. Authoritarian governments often have a clear lack of incentive alignment with their subjects. Democratically elected officials, meanwhile, are focused on winning the next election. None of these lawmakers have an incentive to run a surplus now and slow down the economy to create a reserve of capital from which they could backstop a weak economy later. And if they were to try, they’d likely get voted out of office because people in aggregate always want less taxes and more services in the present.”
What’s clear here is that, beyond the question of being able to manage fiat currency and Keynesian economics well, incentive structures in democracies—in large part by the *way* that elections are held—lead to short-termism in planning as much as the externalities of fiat currency systems themselves do.
In other words, the incentive structures of our voting systems (I’m talking first past the post, mostly here) discourage long-term planning by electoral logic by pushing long-term interest past the electoral cycle. (And it doesn’t have to be that way—and can be far better—under better and more representative voting systems.)
Fiat currencies further enable economic, and therefore political costs to be offset from present decision-making to the future, which also obscures accountability. “Is this inflation or slump all, partly, or none of the fault of X Fed/Presidential/Congressional policy?” And even then, most voters won’t (and I’d argue, fairly can’t be reliably expected) to connect all the dots there.
The two reinforce each other. In my mind, the sound money movement is therefore just one half of the solution to perhaps the biggest challenge for free societies and liberal democracies in the 21st century. Institutional reform and renewal is the other. Neither fixes the entire equation alone—both are necessary.
What do you think?
Stay curious and stack sats.