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The Bitcoin Hole
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Comparing Bitcoin software & hardware wallets, seed backup solutions, nodes & books: http://thebitcoinhole.com Twitter: @thebitcoinhole
I would like to hear the opinion of the Bitcoin community. While I was researching different assisted wallets for The Bitcoin Hole, I came across a case that I'm not sure how to categorize. Here's the scenario: An assisted wallet, where the owner and the service provider need both to sign a transaction to move the funds. You can think this a 2-of-2 multisig, where the service provider has one key and the owner the other. However you can also implement this with MPC (Multi-Party Computation). The implementation is not the issue. I define something as "non-custodial" or "self-custodial" when these two conditions are met: 1- The provider can't move the funds without owner's permission. 2- The owner can access its funds without the provider's permission. In the previous case, condition 1 is satisfied, but condition 2 is not. So, my conclusion is that this assisted wallet can't be categorized as "non-custodial" or "self-custodial". Some questions I have in my mind: - Is my conclusion correct? - Is there any difference between "non-custodial" or "self-custodial"? - Since the assisted wallet in this case cannot be considered "custodial" (as the provider cannot move the funds without the owner's permission), how should it be categorized? @lunaticoin @ODELL @jack @DETERMINISTIC OPTIMISM 🌞 @Leo Wandersleb @Arkad
Don't trust, verify Are you uncertain whether the hardware wallet you received has been tampered with? Inspect the packaging, the device and install the firmware yourself before using it. Unsure about what the firmware is doing? Check if it's open-source and verify it. Not confident that the source code matches the firmware you installed? Verify if the build is reproducible. Doubtful about trusting the key generation of the wallet? Generate your own entropy by rolling dice and use a passphrase. Lack trust in the hardware wallet manufacturer or the hardware itself? Setup a multisig with wallets from different manufacturers. Concerned that the software wallet used for multisig might be compromised? Utilize hardware wallets with screens to verify transactions and receive addresses. Worried that the computer/mobile where you install the software wallet might contains malware that steals your private keys? Use hardware wallets that are 100% air-gapped. Unsure which hardware wallet to buy? Take a look at our website. Don't even trust this tweet, verify it
Two new features to compare added to our Software Wallets comparison. Seed Phrase Autocomplete Some wallets support to autocomplete each seed phrase word when importing your private key. This feature increase the protection against keyloggers stealing your seed phrase, because you don't need to type the complete words. In-app Keyboard Some wallets render an In-app keyboard when importing a seed phrase or entering a passphrase. This feature protect the users against keyloggers stealing your seed phrase or passphrase. image