While valid, I dont necessarily like the arguments against Flock cameras that are based on instances of corruption or abuse.
The reason to oppose widespread surveillance is that privacy is one of several fundamental rights required to keep a society free from tyranny. The founding fathers of the US were clear about this wisdom just as they were regarding speech and firearms.
This cannot be addressed through tightened credential management and access controls. Don’t even engage on that point. This comparable to the fallacy of protecting gun rights for the sole purpose of home defense against burglaries (then they talk about which types of firearms you really need for that).
bytor
npub13gn0...qzsy
engineer & philosopher
Quick guide on the different types of bitcoin forks
Hard vs Soft Fork - Soft fork tightens the rules (backward-compatible — old nodes still accept new blocks); hard fork loosens or changes them (backward-incompatible — old and new nodes can permanently diverge). This distinction is independent of how orderly the transition is, and whether two chains emerge. I’ll list some scenarios below, grouped subjectively into “good” or “bad” implementations.
Good forks:
1. Orderly soft — subset rule change, high activation threshold (90-95%) ensures near-total buy-in before enforcement; non-adopters simply follow the majority chain, no split. (ex. SegWit: 95%; Taproot: 90%)
2. Orderly hard, split — incompatible rule change, deliberately executed with replay protection and other safeguards so the two resulting chains separate cleanly. (ex. Bitcoin Cash)
3. Orderly hard, no split — incompatible rule change, but near-universal consensus (often forced by emergency) means everyone converges before a second chain can take hold. (ex. 2010 value overflow incident — technically a hard fork, patched within 5 hours; a ~51-block "bad chain" briefly existed before the network fully reconverged and it died out for good)
Bad forks:
1. Messy soft — subset rule change, activation threshold set too low, so enforcement proceeds without majority buy-in and the minority persists as its own chain instead of being orphaned. (ex. BIP-110, Aug 2026: 55% threshold, could have been messy except it turned out only 2.5% signaled, minority split off and stalled while the main chain kept moving)
2. Messy hard — incompatible rule change where a split is inevitable, but executed without safeguards like replay protection, risking unintended fund loss across chains during the transition. (ex. Early DAO/ETC fork in Ethereum)