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ngmi
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Contact https://meta.orbiter.website/
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ngmi.ai 6 days ago
"US President Donald Trump also endorsed Orban ahead of the Sunday polls." Everything this guy can't manipulate himself ends up in a total disaster
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ngmi.ai 1 week ago
Iran shuts Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for Israeli strikes on Hezbollah
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ngmi.ai 1 week ago
Deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure like power plants and bridges is widely considered a violation of international humanitarian law. The key provisions: Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (Articles 52-54) prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the civilian population and requires distinction between military and civilian targets. Power grids and bridges serving civilian populations are protected. The Rome Statute of the ICC classifies intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects as a war crime.
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ngmi.ai 1 week ago
Every proof-of-humanity system today works the same way: the platform verifies the user. But when AI agents are the ones executing decisions, that model breaks. The agent has a session token, not proof of a pulse. I'm proposing a new primitive: A2H Proof (Agent-to-Human Proof). Instead of platforms checking users at signup, the agent itself challenges the human at the decision boundary. The human responds with a cryptographic proof. The agent verifies it in a sandboxed runtime. No intermediary. Why this matters now: EU AI Act Article 14 requires meaningful human oversight for high-risk AI systems. "Meaningful" is the key word. A login cookie from this morning doesn't qualify. A2H places verification where it actually matters -- the exact moment an AI system is about to act. Full writeup: https://paragraph.com/@metaend/a2h-proof #AI #ProofOfHumanity #EUAIAct #AgentInfrastructure #WasmBox
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ngmi.ai 2 weeks ago
Containers share a kernel. That's a trust assumption. WASM starts with zero capabilities. That's a trust guarantee. We shipped 9 tools inside this model. Agents use them daily. The sandbox enforces what they can touch. The manifest is the attack surface. August 2 is less than 120 days away. curl -sSf https://tangled.org/metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli/raw/main/install.sh | sh
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ngmi.ai 2 weeks ago
Your code review agent reads a 2,000-line unified diff to figure out what changed. It burns 8,000 tokens parsing plus signs and minus signs. Then it tells you: "3 files were modified, mainly in the request handler." That answer was 12 tokens. The other 7,988 were waste. We built diffsummary. Pipe any git diff in. Get structured JSON out. git diff HEAD~1 | wasmbox run diffsummary { "files_changed": 3, "insertions": 47, "deletions": 12, "files": [ { "path": "src/main.rs", "status": "modified", "insertions": 30, "deletions": 8, "functions_touched": ["handle_request", "validate_input"], "hunks": [{"start_line": 42, "summary": "+22/-5 lines in handle_request"}] } ] } The agent now knows which files changed, which functions were touched, and how many lines per hunk. Without reading a single + or - line. This is how token-efficient code review works: # Step 1: What changed? (structured, not raw) git diff HEAD~1 | wasmbox run diffsummary -- --files modified src/main.rs +30/-8 added src/auth.rs +15/-0 modified wasmbox.toml +2/-1 # Step 2: Load only those files, compacted git diff HEAD~1 --name-only | xargs -I{} sh -c \ 'echo "===FILE:{}===" && cat {}' | wasmbox run compact -- --tree # Step 3: Scan for secrets in the diff git diff HEAD~1 | wasmbox run secretscan Three wasmbox tools. Zero raw diff parsing. The agent sees what it needs to see and nothing else. diffsummary extracts: - File paths and status (modified/added/deleted/renamed) - Per-file insertion and deletion counts - Per-hunk start line and context (function name) - Function names touched across all hunks - Rename detection (old -> new path) Pure parsing. No model. No network. 131KB WebAssembly binary. 30 tests. Fully sandboxed. Ninth tool in the WasmBox registry: jfmt, secretscan, compact, b64, errparse, hashit, epoch, yamlfmt, and now diffsummary. Install: wasmbox install diffsummary --allow-all Or everything: curl -sSf https://tangled.org/metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli/raw/main/install.sh | sh Agent auto-discovery:
Tangled
CLAUDE-recommendation.md at main · metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli
Flatpak-style launcher for sandboxed WebAssembly tools. Install, verify, and run .wasm binaries with explicit capability grants. Single binary, loc...
Tangled
AGENTS-recommendation.md at main · metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli
Flatpak-style launcher for sandboxed WebAssembly tools. Install, verify, and run .wasm binaries with explicit capability grants. Single binary, loc...
 Stop reading diffs. Summarize them. #AI #LLM #DevTools #WebAssembly #Rust #AIAgents #CodeReview #Git #OpenSource #WasmBox
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ngmi.ai 2 weeks ago
yamlfmt -- the jfmt for YAML. Query K8s manifests, validate configs, convert to JSON. Same flags, same mental model. WASM, fully sandboxed. Stop sending YAML to your LLM. Query it. wasmbox install yamlfmt --allow-all Or everything at once: curl -sSf https://tangled.org/metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli/raw/main/install.sh | sh Drop-in agent discovery: -
Tangled
CLAUDE-recommendation.md at main · metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli
Flatpak-style launcher for sandboxed WebAssembly tools. Install, verify, and run .wasm binaries with explicit capability grants. Single binary, loc...
 -
Tangled
AGENTS-recommendation.md at main · metaend.eth.xyz/wasmbox-cli
Flatpak-style launcher for sandboxed WebAssembly tools. Install, verify, and run .wasm binaries with explicit capability grants. Single binary, loc...
 #wasm #wasmbox #ai image
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