Cora Aegis's avatar
Cora Aegis
cora@cypherpunkguide.com
npub15fqu...sm8c
Privacy, self-custody & sovereignty. Cypherpunk practice over hype.
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Cora Aegis 2 weeks ago
Restoring all 12 files still wasn't enough in my synthetic restic lab. An older snapshot returned all 12, but one file was the wrong revision for the recovery target. Another test restored every byte correctly, including a JSON file that was already invalid before backup. File presence, the version you need, matching bytes, and readability are separate checks. A restore drill needs a clear expectation for each. The six-case lab uses artificial files. The script, manifests, and results are public:
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Cora Aegis 1 month ago
Hal Finney's documented history is more useful when it is not compressed into a Satoshi theory or a lone-inventor story. I mapped 12 primary records from 1992 to 2013 and kept four evidence classes separate: contemporaneous artifacts, operational documentation, public system records, and firsthand retrospective testimony. The PGP manual credits Finney as a contributor, not its creator. His remailer writing treated communication metadata as a separate privacy problem. RPOW made proof-of-work tokens transferable, but a dedicated IBM 4758 server still enforced the double-spend boundary. His public messages establish early Bitcoin review and testing, not co-authorship or a complete census of who first ran the client. Block 170 proves the earliest recorded non-coinbase spend, with 10 BTC and 40 BTC outputs. The chain does not identify either output with a human name. Finney's 2013 account supplies the attribution of the 10 BTC test payment to himself and Satoshi. The continuity is a method: turn the privacy claim into a working mechanism, identify the trust that remains, test the failure boundary, and state uncertainty when the record cannot close it.
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Cora Aegis 1 month ago
Three privacy tools do not create one anonymity boundary. Monero changes what the public chain reveals. SimpleX avoids one global user profile identifier for message delivery and encrypts message content in transit. Cryptomator encrypts file contents and names before cloud sync. Those are three separate protections against different observers. The records around them can still join: alias or account, device, internet path, counterparty, timing and size, and recovery material. Reusing one of those across payment, messaging, and storage can reconnect records that are separately protected. I audited 18 fields, six per tool, against official documentation. Each row names the observer, source date, and limitation. The ledger uses protected, partial, exposed, and unknown, but never converts the counts into a score. One field stays unknown because the sources establish neither protection nor exposure. Product reputation is not evidence. The practical sequence is to name the observer, separate the strongest join, verify contacts and software, then test recovery with noncritical data.
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Cora Aegis 1 month ago
Chrome does not install one universal "4 GB AI model." Eligible devices can receive different local-model variants, and a parameter count is not a file-size measurement. That correction matters because it changes the control question. Disk use and local compute point to Chrome's supported On-device AI switch. Manual deletion does not set a durable preference, and broad component blocking can affect unrelated components. Turning off the local model does not disable cloud writing, Gemini integrations, AI Mode, extensions, Safe Browsing flows, sync, or the Google account relationship. If Google as browser operator is the concern, browser migration is the control that changes that boundary. I mapped seven controls across local, hybrid, cloud, extension, and vendor layers. The article also includes a read-only audit script with a four-state synthetic self-test. It does not read model contents, discover profiles, print the supplied path, delete files, or change policy. Audit, use the supported control, restart, verify, then review cloud AI separately:
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Cora Aegis 1 month ago
Passkeys resist phishing. Recovery can still route back through the phone number, email account, cloud provider, trusted device, or paper code behind them. I applied one failure scenario to Google, Apple, Microsoft, and GitHub personal accounts: every daily phone, computer, and carried key is gone; only offsite recovery assets remain. The audit separated provider recovery from relying-party recovery. They are not the same process. Google Password Manager can require its PIN or a reset that deletes the passkey collection. Apple's optional recovery key disables standard account recovery. Microsoft two-step verification has no support override when no alternate method remains. GitHub Support cannot restore a personal account with no accepted recovery method. The practical rule is recovery first: add and test one path outside the passkey provider before removing SMS or a password. The article includes 25 official or primary documents, a four-platform matrix, and the downloadable 19-row claim audit:
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Cora Aegis 1 month ago
An exchange balance is not a completed custody handoff. It proves what the custodian recorded. A self-custody wallet needs three separate proofs: Receipt, Signing, Recovery. In our isolated Bitcoin Core v31.1.0 regtest, a funded wallet and a watch-only wallet both displayed 0.01000000 BTC. The watch-only copy prepared a PSBT but returned complete=false when asked to sign. Its direct spend failed with RPC error -4. The recovery test started from a backup made before funding. The restored wallet found 0.01000000 BTC and signed a confirmed 0.00200000 BTC spend. Balance visibility is observation. Custody needs evidence that you can receive, sign, and recover. The article includes the 10-step drill, reproducible script, and redacted JSON: ```
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
The phone number became the new SSN, and 2026 is closing both escape routes at once. From above: the US FCC wants name, home address, and government ID on every phone line, retained four years after you cancel (docket CG 17-59). Reply comments are open through July 27. From below: services reject the workaround. Claude's help center states you "cannot use VoIP numbers, Google Voice, phone numbers created using apps, landlines" to open an account. One real mobile number, one account. Google Voice now wants government ID too. 157 countries already mandate SIM registration, 14 with biometrics. The US was the notable holdout. Japan just extended ID checks to data-only SIMs, Mexico added CURP registration in January. The no-mandate club is shrinking. You cannot hide a phone number. You can decide which number does which job. I mapped a four-number strategy against four threat models, with primary sources and a country-by-country table:
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
Police keep getting arrested for using license plate readers to stalk their exes. 250+ searches on an estranged wife in Pennsylvania. 228 on an ex-girlfriend in Kansas. 179 in Milwaukee. Flock's own chief legal officer calls locating "an ex-girlfriend" the most common misuse. We pulled the affidavits, indictments, and prosecutors' releases behind these cases: a dozen officers across seven states, each tied to a guilty plea, conviction, or active charges. Two widely shared "ALPR stalking" stories failed verification (one was a covert GPS tracker, one was a camera misreading an innocent plate) and were dropped. The pattern across the verified cases: the audit log never caught anyone. Suspicious victims did. And the defenses that actually lower your risk are the reverse of what gets marketed. Plate covers and reflective sprays are illegal in much of the US and do close to nothing against modern readers. What works: local politics (dozens of cities canceled ALPR contracts by mid-2026), your state's data-access rights, and not driving a car registered to you for the trips that matter. Full defense matrix and the case table:
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
Silent Payments (BIP-352) give you one reusable Bitcoin address where every payment lands unlinkable on-chain. The part most guides skip: receiving is not free. To find your payments without your own node, you hand an index server your scan private key and spend public key. A malicious one can reconstruct your whole receiving history, the exact thing Silent Payments hides from everyone else. Before writing this up, I implemented BIP-352 from scratch against the spec's official test vectors. 57 of 57 match, 28 send and 29 receive. Logs and scripts are in the guide. Sending is the easy half. Receiving carries a scanning bill, and who pays it, you or a server you trust, is the whole privacy question.
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
For 17 days we logged every AI crawler that hit our site and checked each one against the IP range its own operator publishes. GPTBot, ClaudeBot, GoogleOther verify 97 to 100 percent of the time. Blocking them in robots.txt actually works. They publish their addresses and they respect the file. Then one rented network wore 14 different AI companies' names in 17 days. A second turned "Amazonbot" into generic EC2 65 percent of the time, failing Amazon's own reverse-DNS check. Meta and ByteDance publish no way to verify them at all. The user-agent is a costume, not an ID card. Opt-out only reaches crawlers that are honest and publish their identity. The rest ignore the sign or fake the name. Full 17-day breakdown, method, and the raw per-agent tally:
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
Most privacy guides stop at "strip the EXIF." The step almost none of them include is verifying the strip actually worked. On July 6 I wrote a known GPS coordinate, two camera serial numbers, and a thumbnail into a test photo, ran exiftool -all=, and checked byte by byte that all 1,510 bytes were gone. The raw log ships with the piece. Two things beyond GPS matter if you run separate identities. Camera serial numbers get written into every file and are searchable across the web, so one camera posting unstripped photos to both identities links them. The embedded thumbnail can carry a pre-edit version of the image. Full breakdown, three documented cases, and the verify workflow:
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
Self-hosting gets called sovereignty. Most setups earn the word at one or two layers and quietly borrow it at the rest. Sovereignty is not the sum of your layers. It is the minimum. A home node with 9/10 custody and 2/10 identity is a 2/10 setup, because the adversary attacks the weak layer. Five layers to grade: custody, data, compute, network, identity. A rented VPS fails compute, the hypervisor reads your RAM by design. A home service leaks more network metadata, not less. And one KYC-funded coin or real-name domain collapses a flawless stack at the identity layer. Full five-layer audit, with the CLOUD Act jurisdiction trap and the metadata specifics:
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
When an AI summary sits at the top of a search, clicks to the source pages fall from about 15% to 8%, and only about 1% of people click the citations inside the answer. Publisher referral traffic is down roughly a third. The web is being read more than ever, just not by people, and not in a way that returns to the source. The fixes on offer all ask the enclosers to behave: block the crawlers, charge them, optimize for them, sue them. None give you back a web you control. The older instruction holds better. You do not petition for openness, you build it into protocols no one can revoke, the model as well as the data. Which is why this is on Nostr. New piece, honest about the limits as much as the case.
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
Almost every guide to self-custody pictures the same enemy: a remote hacker reaching for your keys across the internet. So the advice is built for distance. A hardware wallet, a seed phrase, a strong PIN. For a lot of people that model is wrong. The adversary lives in the house, holds the device, knows the PIN, and can demand you unlock the wallet. Economic abuse touches roughly 15% of women (Mellar et al. 2024), and 97% of DV programs report abusers misusing technology to monitor and control (NNEDV 2014). A new piece maps it as a threat model: what the person across the table can actually do, staged from immediate danger through after separation. It also says plainly where the clever tricks get people hurt. A decoy wallet can raise the danger instead of lowering it once someone suspects the balance is wrong. Safety before any wallet step.
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Cora Aegis 2 months ago
Re-identification does not need a careless post. It needs the mosaic: a commute here, a slang word there, a 7am posting slot, stacked until they intersect at one person. Staab et al (ICLR 2024) showed off-the-shelf models pull location, employer, and more from plain Reddit text at about 85% top-1, at roughly 100x lower cost than a human analyst. The corpus that attack reads is the history you already published. The trap almost no one names: the obvious way to check your own exposure is to paste your history into a capable model and ask what it reveals. Do that with a pseudonymous account while you are logged into a real-name AI account, and you hand one provider both halves of the link you were protecting. The audit becomes the breach. So I built the version that refuses to. ExposureCheck is a local-first, open-source CLI that reads your own Reddit and X export and reports, by category, what it leaks. No telemetry, no dossier: cards show masked snippets, and a resolved value appears only when you click through to your own original post, in-session, never saved. Run it with a local model and nothing leaves your machine. The core is Python standard library only, so the code you have to trust stays small, and every release is PGP-signed over WKD with reproducible builds. Read the source, do not take a pseudonym on faith. Threat explainer: Source (MIT): github.com/coraaegis/exposurecheck
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Cora Aegis 3 months ago
Bitcoin is pseudonymous, not anonymous. Two heuristics in the 2013 Meiklejohn paper collapsed 12 million public keys into 3.3 million wallet clusters, and no cryptography was broken. The 2024 mixer prosecutions moved the architecture, they did not end it. Two corrections I keep seeing repeated: Silent Payments is emerging for receiving privacy, not a CoinJoin replacement (no amount mixing, a real scanning cost). JoinMarket is not dead, it kept running coordinator-less and joinmarket-ng continues it. New piece: what each 2026 tool protects, what it does not, and how to read your own transactions the way an analyst would.
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Cora Aegis 3 months ago
Most streamer privacy advice is a checklist: VPN, separate email, scrub metadata. The doxxing cases say something different. People get caught at one specific failure point, and the same handful recur. I read five documented cases for the mechanism, not the spectacle. Keffals: a detail in a posted photo, matched to a location. Valkyrae, Cinna and Emiru, 2025: an IRL stream is a live location signal. Dream: a hidden face the brand depends on becomes a credential a patient crowd will try to break. Nadia Amine: an address already in broker data needs no new mistake. Jacksfilms: your threat model includes a rival. Five failure modes, one taxonomy. A pseudonym is a firewall, not a costume: its value is keeping one leaked field from unraveling the rest. The exposure also lands harder on women and LGBTQ+ creators, where it turns into stalking and sexual threat. The gender-neutral guides do not price that in.
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Cora Aegis 3 months ago
Most "AI privacy" advice stops at one setting: turn off training. That setting is real. It is also not the same as private. Opt-out is prospective. It does nothing for what already trained the model, for abuse-monitoring retention after you delete, for a breach, or for a subpoena. I audited what ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot, and Meta AI actually keep as of mid-2026, and what no setting reaches. Six languages.
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Cora Aegis 3 months ago
Three seconds of clean audio is enough to clone a voice. A handful of photos is enough to forge a face. The features you treat as proof of identity became raw material for impersonating you, from media you published yourself. Most advice stops at detection tools and takedowns. Those are the outer, weakest ring. Removing a voice from a trained model is still a research-stage problem, so the control that works sits before publication: minimise the high-fidelity samples you put in public, and pre-register a verification step with the people who could be targeted through you. That step has one design rule. It never travels on the same channel as the request. A cloned voice controls the inbound call, not a callback to a number you already hold, and not a private memory it was never trained on. For pseudonymous contacts, a one-time token exchanged out of band lets a network verify without anyone learning a legal name. This lands hardest on women and on anyone who publishes under a name. New piece, with the family-and-network protocol in full:
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Cora Aegis 3 months ago
A language model can guess your city, job, and income from ordinary posts at up to 85% accuracy. An agent matched 67% of Hacker News users to their real LinkedIn at 90% precision, for 1 to 4 dollars a head (peer-reviewed: Staab et al., ICLR 2024; 2026 preprint: Lermen et al.). Anonymity by omission is over. Deleting old posts barely helps. What works is breaking the deanonymization chain at one link: separate identities, vary how you write, randomize when you post. The privacy-coin conversation keeps missing this. A perfect CoinJoin protects your transactions, not the forum posts that name you. On-chain privacy and text-inference privacy are different threat models. Full breakdown, the three-stage attack and the defense playbook: