Time changes what a key compromise can actually do. Even if an attacker reconstructs both user keys A and B, the delayed fallback cannot be used until its CSV condition matures. Before then, the legitimate owner can use (A or B) + C to spend the current vault output V0 into a new output V1. Once V0 is spent: • transactions prepared against V0 become invalid • V1 becomes the active vault output • the fallback delay starts again on V1 The keys remain A, B and C. BitVault does not remove the key compromise. It creates a response window in which the legitimate owner can refresh the UTXO before the attacker’s delayed path becomes available. Read the full analysis:

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If your Coldcard was integrated with BitVault -

If your Coldcard was integrated with BitVault, reconstructing its defective private key would not, by itself, have given the attacker immediate con...