Such nonsense. Not only do the English change the names of cities and countries... They also change other languages. RETARDED! -------------------------------------- The Anglicized pronunciation of Latin, often called Traditional English or Anglo-Latin, is a system that evolved alongside the English language, adapting Latin sounds to fit English phonology and spelling conventions rather than reconstructing ancient Roman speech. It differs from Classical Latin primarily by pronouncing ae and oe as /eɪ/ (like "day"), c and g as soft sounds (/s/ and /dʒ/) before e and i (e.g., Caesar as "See-zar"), and treating h as silent or aspirated depending on the word. Key characteristics of this pronunciation include: Vowel Adaptation: Diphthongs like ae and oe are merged into single vowel sounds familiar to English speakers, while final -us is typically pronounced /əs/ (like "us") rather than the Classical /ʊs/. Consonant Shifts: The letter j and consonantal i are pronounced as /dʒ/ (like "judge"), and v is used for both Classical v and u. Palatalization: Sounds like ti before a vowel often become /ʃi/ (like "sh"), seen in words like minutiae (pronounced "min-yoo-shee-eye" in traditional usage). This system was standard in the English-speaking world until the mid-20th century, when Ecclesiastical Latin (the Vatican pronunciation) and Reconstructed Classical Latin gained prominence in academic and religious contexts, though the Anglicized form remains prevalent in legal, medical, and traditional academic settings in the UK and US

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RT International

How Iran exposed the limits of US and Israeli military power

Washington and Israel sought a decisive result against Iran. Instead, the war showed why modern power struggles increasingly end in stalemate

Why the US-Israel war on Iran failed Tehran just showed why military supremacy no longer guarantees political victory Published 17 Jun, 2026 11:15 Fyodor Lukyanov By Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Russia in Global Affairs RGA on Telegram Why the US-Israel war on Iran failed People look at a makeshift memorial for the U.S. service members killed during the US-Israel War on Iran on March 09, 2026 in Tel Aviv, Israel. © Alexi J. Rosenfeld / Getty Images The war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran deserves a place in contemporary international relations textbooks. Not because it overturns everything we know about power, but because it shows how the use of power is changing. Classical approaches to relations between states still matter and the balance of power hasn’t disappeared. Military superiority still counts, but the consequences of using force have become less predictable than before because coercion no longer produces linear outcomes. This applies not only to direct military intervention, as in the case of Iran, but also to sanctions and other forms of pressure. If one strips away the rhetoric, which all sides require for domestic reasons, the picture is straightforward. A coalition that was clearly stronger, consisting of the US, Israel, and the Arab Gulf states, failed to achieve the objectives it set for itself when it launched a military campaign against a clearly weaker adversary: Iran and its allied groups in the region, with likely limited support from Russia and China. The aim was to deliver a swift, crushing blow to a regime considered weakened by external pressure and internal divisions. Donald Trump’s demand for “unconditional surrender” captured the mood perfectly as the assumption was that Tehran would buckle under the pressure. The calm in Hormuz could be dangerously brief Read more The calm in Hormuz could be dangerously brief The opposite happened and the attacking side’s superior forces were met with unexpectedly high resilience. Iran didn’t collapse after the initial decapitation strike and instead it reorganized, mobilized and, most importantly, cast aside many of the constraints that had previously limited its response. This is where one of the defining features of the new era came into view as asymmetrical counter-action. Iran couldn’t match the US and Israel in conventional strength, but it didn’t need to because it used the tools available to it in ways that offset many of the enemy’s advantages. First, it moved to close the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, something it had long threatened but never before dared to do. Second, it struck not only American targets in the region, but also the assets of key US partners. Third, it relied on large weapons stockpiles which, although inferior to those of the US and Israel, were sufficient to inflict serious damage on countries unused to absorbing such blows. Fourth, Iran demonstrated a tolerance for damage substantially higher than that of its enemies. The current outcome speaks for itself as none of the issues over which the US and Israel went to war has been resolved. Everything has once again been deferred to future negotiations and everyone understands that negotiations in the tradition of Persian diplomacy mean tenacity and patience. In essence, after an intense armed conflict that threw the whole world into turmoil, the status quo that had been destroyed at the beginning of the war has simply been restored. The Strait of Hormuz is to be reopened to shipping, although even the conditions for that remain unclear as both sides interpret them differently. Trump’s Iran truce marks a defeat for American power Read more Trump’s Iran truce marks a defeat for American power The experience of recent years shows that the scope for achieving political objectives through military force is narrowing. The weaker side’s capacity to resist is growing, while the stronger side’s willingness to accept serious risks, especially risks to its own domestic stability, is diminishing. This applies to many conflicts, but it is particularly visible in the Middle East. The broader political consequence is the relative weakening of the dominant power in the shape of the US. Trump has shown that he is deeply reluctant to become embroiled in another full-scale military confrontation, having failed to achieve his objectives in a war he himself began.... O