I'm curious what your take on it not actually being sufficient to keep data off chain is. As I understand it, it may make arbitrary data a bit more expensive, and break it up into pieces, but at the end of the day, Peter Todd's stunt putting the whole text of BIP-444 in a compliant transaction seemed sufficient to me to indicate that any hope that it'd be sufficient to keep arbitrary data off chain from a determined attacker is in vain. And meanwhile, to offset the additional costs to the attacker come the additional load from the expanded UTXO set. If data being broken into pieces or otherwise obscured is enough to absolve any moral or legal responsibilities, I move to reopen the case of anyone who was found guilty for operating criminal enterprises over Tor, because that data being encrypted surely means it doesn't count -- right? This is all aside from the minimal hash power behind the fork, which is another matter that I think makes it DOA. But if there's a reason I should be lamenting this that I'm missing I'd love to hear your take.