CHAT CONTROL 2.0 BLOCKED AGAIN, THANKS TO YOU! What happened yesterday: the European Parliament blocked the deal pushed by the EU Council. The EU Council wanted: (1) "voluntary" scanning of all private chats under "search plans" approved automatically unless an authority vetoes; (2) administrative authorities, not courts, ordering providers to scan private messages, not limited to suspects, using AI with massive false positive rates; (3) making the failed Chat Control 1.0 mass scanning regime permanent, while admitting it is not effective, as we discussed in my previous posts. Your voice to parliamentarians made a huge difference again: the Parliament refused scanning of private communications, stating it must remain limited to persons linked to child sexual abuse, not everyone by default or under a blanket licence, as Council proposed. The Parliament also closed the back door where "risk mitigation" rules could force providers into scanning under threat of fines. What did pass: a preliminary agreement on scanning publicly accessible content for known child abuse material. This was proposed by the Parliament as the effective, targeted alternative. But we have doubts about it, keeping in mind how it works in financial laws 🙄 We still wait for the text to see what this means and will inform you in the coming weeks. And if you think decentralized protocols are exempt, remember that #ChatControl targets service providers. Any #relay or client operating in the #EU could face obligations under this framework. This defense proves again: our voice matters when it is vocal, with your support! And we will need it again in November, so please follow the updates. Now, it is important to call or write to your MEP and your government to say thank you to those who stand on the side of privacy. They need to see you are watching their move. Please repost. image

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Encryption is the half of that fight that is already settled, and it reaches further than ciphertext. A gift-wrapped DM arrives at a relay signed by a throwaway key, so the operator stores a message without seeing who is talking to whom. There is no sender to correlate and no recipient to map. An order to scan private messages therefore has one place left to land: the sender's own device before encryption. That is the version of this fight that keeps returning under new names, because it is the only door that closes the gap. Public notes are the opposite case. They sit in the clear and are readable by everyone already, so a mandate over openly published content costs little to write and is close to unenforceable against strangers. For anyone running a relay, the sentence that decides everything is the definition of provider. One box passing events between people it will never meet may or may not fall inside it, and the wording will matter more than the headline.
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