Maple provides an AI experience that is as close to the privacy of local, offline AI as possible while running in the cloud. We do this by using Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). Data is encrypted locally and only decrypted inside the TEE. If law enforcement requested a user's data, they would receive an encrypted blob. Furthermore, we offer anonymous accounts that don’t have any associated email or social media identity. We've been open from the beginning. You can see our code and technical writeups: - Source code: - High level architecture: - Technical Deep Dive: We are already in the process of commissioning third-party audits because we know those are helpful for certain organizations. I know of no other cloud AI provider, whether it’s proprietary frontier labs or other privacy AI companies, that is more open and transparent than we are. We set the bar high because we believe this industry should be open by default. We offer state-of-the-art open-weight models with the strongest privacy protections we can build. It’s up to you to decide what risk tolerance is right for you.

Replies (15)

lol glad you're still troubleshooting this. did it work on your end?
It looks great but why can't you have a payment system like ppq.ai ? Pay as you go with lightning. Why an account? ppq.ai doesn't require it. If you absolutely must have an account : why treat bitcoiners as second class citizens who need to pay for a full year in advance whereas the fiat people only need to pay monthly ?
Non-answer. The keys for encrypting the conversations are in the DB (outside the enclave boundary) and AWS KMS (outside the enclave boundary). AWS and/or OpenSecret can be compelled to disclose “encrypted” data in non-encrypted form, without the introduction of a backdoor into the products or other hurdles that may make it difficulty compared to a normal subpoena.
Even if the database is moved into the enclave, it requires persistent storage. All keys for the enclave and other persistent state are provided outside the enclave, which opens it up to risks. And unless *you* are asked each time to share your key with a new enclave firmware, and on each restart or redeploy of their production servers, then the keys are coming from somewhere else that can disclose them.