Hits hard, computer tech is accelerating...

This doesn't help massive adoption, but price impact shows we're just few dozens freaks😓

Using Monero helps as it adds economic cost (scanning through blockchain history).

Consider in your recommendations though, that a 2 of 3 12 word multisig is not using 256bits of entropy, it's using 129. An attacker had to break a 128bit key twice with 3 targets. The best practice right now is to not have all your bitcoin in one basket, and whether you're multisigning or otherwise you should not trust one party.

What is nonsense about dice? If you're insinuating that 50 rolls equating to ~128 bits of entropy is crackable, then the entire security model is broken on its face. Am I the only person in the world who's played Yahtzee? I've rolled thousands of dice at this point and it's never been difficult, not one time.

You're making the same mistake again; I don't have time to argue.

I'm not arguing. I'm just telling you you're wrong. The DICE Entropy Addition software is open source and comparable to other iterations, producing the same results from the same base key. Zero trust involved.

Multi-sig without hardware?

Please consider taking the time to explain your position. We're dealing with a fundamentally important concept, and it appears you're insinuating that dice rolls are either unsafe or unnecessary if using multisig, something that doesn't make sense to most of us. So, again, please take the time to explain this, or at least point to a place where you've already done so. Thanks!

What do you think with multisign with three satochip smartcards and a seedsigner?

¿Podrías explicar por qué ya no consideras segura una frase semilla con alta entropía? ¿Es por BIP39 en sí? (Sé que tiene detractores). Gracias.

La Jade Plus también tiene poca entropía? Incluso una clave de 24 palabras?

I’m genuinely curious about the issue with dice rolls. Are you saying it’s an opsec issue or an entropy issue? Assuming the goal is to generate a minimum of 128 bits worth of entropy.

linux, mac and windows system entropy are all fine. obviously ony linux live usb can be done airgapped on a fresh machine never connected to a network. this is basically what a seedsigner is but unlike the tiny linux on a tiny rpi the desktop linux has at least the mouse to add entropy, and it does, by default. modern linux (5.17+ especially) mixes entropy from: - **input devices** — keyboard, mouse, touchscreen (add_input_randomness) - **network devices** — interrupt timing on packet arrival (add_network_randomness via add_interrupt_randomness) - **block devices** — disk interrupt timing (add_disk_randomness) - **rdrand/rdseed** — CPU hardware RNG if available, mixed in, not trusted exclusively - **jitter entropy** — CPU execution timing variance as a fallback source - **boot-time entropy** — saved seed from previous shutdown, fed back on boot the CSPRNG (chacha20-based) is reseeded continuously from all of these. the old blocking `/dev/random` vs non-blocking `/dev/urandom` distinction is gone since 5.17 — both are the same CSPRNG, and you cannot deplete entropy. the coldcard failure was an embedded micropython problem — no kernel entropy infrastructure, no multi-source mixing, just a misconfigured hardware RNG falling back to a deterministic yasmarang PRNG seeded from chip serial and clock. linux has the opposite architecture: assume every source is potentially weak, mix them all.

Es segura, pero estás confiando solo en un fabricante, y si el fabricante del hardware wallet compromete de alguna forma esa passphrase?

Correct me if I'm wrong. Reason for roll dicing is so that the randomness/entropy becomes really strong due to the fact that it'll create high numbers of guesses which is so large that it'll be hard for computers or special devices to crack either the 128 or 192 or 256 bits entropy(+checksums) seedwords generated. Right?

if the entropy generated with dice rolls can be reproduced on a different device it should be safe, no? do you see a way in which the hww manufacturer can mess with that too?

Y generando la seed tú mismo (dados, monedas, etc...), ¿No se minimizaría el riesgo? Sé que es la eterna discusión de los últimos días, pero no está de más saber la opinión de alguien que parece entender.

Either he's saying dice are stoneage tech and thus silly or that you can still fuckup entropy generation if you don't know what you're doing. For the latter, you can do this by having insufficient rolls. Since each six sided die has log2(6) = 2.58 bits of entropy, to get 128 bits you need to roll 50 times (128/2.58 = 49.61) and then pass the roll data (e.g., "623415325...") into a crytographic hash function with at least 128 bit output (e.g. SHA256). If you don't use a hash because of modulo bias, the entropy per roll is only 1.67 bits so you need 77 rolls. Some people might even just roll 10 times or whatever and think it's secure. Point is, you still can fuck it up.

Yeah, I know what he's saying, I am also saying I have walked people through this process about a dozen times and no one said "Wait I have to roll the dice then add it to the program input? I'm SO CONFUSED?!?!" This is simple shit, I say roll 100 times, you roll 100 times, you get a secure, sufficiently entropic seed.

Yeah, I guess he thinks it seems basic and dumb to have to use dice then. Would be nice if he responded in case he does have some good reason.

El tema no es que la seed o la passphrase no sean seguras, el tema es que ese hardware wallet este comprometido de alguna forma y entonces tú seed y passphrase se vean comprometidas. Los hww wallets son mucho más propensos a ataques de cadena de suministro que el hardware convencional. Llegado el punto de paranoia máxima, frente a eso solo te protege la multifirma con diferentes proveedores de hww o tipos de dispositivos como ordenadores offline o teléfonos offline.

I'm against rolling dice simply because we shouldn't have to resort to that. Computer entropy is fine; it's just that Coldcard doesn't use this entropy or that of its chip.

What I mean is: - We light the fire with a lighter - The lighter manufacturer screws up and the lighter doesn't work - We all go back to lighting the fire by striking stones together. Entropy in a computer is fine; the problem is that Coldcard didn't use it. The problem wasn’t the lighter; it’s that the lighter manufacturer didn’t put any gas in it.

Gracias por la respuesta.

Agree. No offline computer for me (OSUpdates are tough), but multipoint with mixed HWWs. When one balance gets too high, time for a new multisig. Just like you need more than one bank product, you’re going to need multiple multi sigma if you’re lucky enough to save a lot of value

Why would rolling dice be nonsense?

frostsnap is nice. it can be used to create a multisig for one of the keys with rotation of signers

Or just use a passphrase. That is feasible for beginners and everyone.

256 bit entropy mitigates this